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ABSTRACT
This report is an initial effort to identify and evaluate safety issues associated with the use
of Flibe (LiF-BeF2) as a molten salt coolant for nuclear fusion power plant applications.  Flibe
experience in the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment is briefly reviewed.  Safety issues identified
include chemical toxicity, radiological issues resulting from neutron activation, and the
operational concerns of handling a high temperature coolant.  Beryllium compounds and fluorine
pose be toxicological concerns.  Some controls to protect workers are discussed.  Since Flibe has
been handled safely in other applications, its hazards appear to be manageable.  Some safety
issues that require further study are pointed out.  Flibe salt interaction with strong magnetic fields
should be investigated.  Evolution of Flibe constituents and activation products at high
temperature (i.e., will Fluorine release as a gas or remain in the molten salt) is an issue.  Aerosol
and tritium release from a Flibe spill requires study, as does neutronics analysis to characterize
radiological doses.  Tritium migration from Flibe into the cooling system is also a safety
concern.  Investigation of these issues will help determine the extent to which Flibe shows
promise as a fusion power plant coolant or plasma-facing material.
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1FLIBE USE IN FUSION REACTORS
A SAFETY ASSESSMENT
1.  INTRODUCTION
The molten salt mixture of LiF and BeF2, commonly referred to as Flibe, is under consideration
for use in fusion reactors.  In magnetic fusion energy (MFE) reactor designs, the Flibe has been
considered as a renewable surface for interfacing with the plasma in high plasma-flux regions
and as a tritium-breeding coolant.  In inertial fusion energy (IFE) designs, it has been considered
as a shielding medium from both neutrons and the hydrodynamic blast of IFE targets.  In this
report, we consider safety issues associated with such uses.  These include chemical and
radiological concerns with regard to biological effects as well as those associated with its
operational and environmental hazards.  Except as relevant to particular safety aspects being
discussed here, no effort will be made to catalogue the various mechanical and chemical
properties of Flibe, since those have been provided elsewhere.[1—14]
2.  FLIBE APPLICATIONS
The use of molten Flibe as a coolant for a magnetic fusion reactor has several engineering
advantages.  Flibe serves as a high temperature heat transfer fluid that achieves high thermal
efficiencies, acts as a good radiation shield, and has modest to good fluid flow properties.[15]
Flibe is used at high temperature, but low pressure.  Any ex-vessel cracks in the coolant piping
are expected to produce small leaks, due to the low coolant pressure.  Only a low frequency pipe
rupture event (i.e., less than 10
-4
/year) should lead to a large coolant spill.
The first major use of Flibe for nuclear power applications was in the 8 MWth Molten Salt
Reactor Experiment (MSRE) constructed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).[16]
Operating between June 1965 and May 1969, the MSRE used a mixture of 66 mole% LiF and 34
mole% BeF2 at 545 to 580°C, 34.4 kPa gauge pressure, and 54 L/s circulation rate as an
intermediate coolant.
One of the early applications of Flibe in fusion reactor designs was in HYLIFE-II.[17]  In that
design, Flibe was circulated at the rate of about 60 m
3
/s through a set of fixed and oscillating jets
and served to shield the first wall from the blast and neutrons as well as to breed tritium.  The
two banks of movable jets, oscillating sinusoidally but 180° out of phase with each other,
provided a moving cavity into which a target pellet could be fired (as from a rifle) and ignited by
either laser or heavy ion beam drivers.  The stationary jets completed the coverage for the
shielding function.
Since then, Flibe has been considered as a coolant and as a plasma-facing material by the
Advanced Liquid Plasma Surface (ALPS) and Advanced Power Extraction (APEX) projects
within the US DOE Office of Fusion Energy Sciences.  Studies are presently underway to
develop methods of getting molten Flibe to conform to the desired shapes in dynamic flow
2situations and to investigate tritium breeding and extraction, chemical compatibility, and other
issues relevant to the application of Flibe in advanced magnetic fusion designs.[18–20]
3.  SAFETY ISSUES
In this report we consider various safety aspects connected with the use of Flibe.  Those are in
three major categories.  The first relates to the chemical and toxicity hazards of the material
itself.  The second is the risk to health posed by activation and radioactivity.  The third is a more
general look at safety concerns associated with industrial hazards and the use of Flibe in typical
fusion reactor systems.
3.1  Chemical and Toxicity Issues
Fortunately, the Flibe itself is not a combustible material.  The magnetic field [21] effects will
have to be evaluated to see if Flibe dissociation occurs, and if so, will yield any appreciable
amounts of constituent elements that are flammable.  Radiolysis is known to cause dissociation,
but the evolution of flammable compounds remains to be evaluated for the fusion environment.
Moir [15] states that Flibe recombines reasonably fast from radiolytic decomposition, and it is
also expected to quickly recombine from the Hall effect as well because of the chemically
reactive nature of fluorine.
Individually, the chemical constituents of Flibe, fluorine, lithium, and beryllium, are highly
reactive and therefore hazardous materials.  When reacted together to form LiF and BeF2,
however, they become rather passive and do not show substantial chemical reactivity.
Beryllium is tentatively labeled a carcinogen [22–24], and exposure may lead to deleterious lung
function.  Lithium fluoride has not yet been investigated by the scientific community for its
toxicity.  There could be exposure to corrosion products as well.
Two of the constituents of Flibe (beryllium and fluorine) and several of its impurities have
threshold limit values (TLVs) for airborne exposure [25].  The current TLVs are given in
Table 1.  While the Flibe salt will have only the beryllium compound TLV, that TLV is a low
value.  The low TLV indicates that even small releases will pose a health threat.  However, it is
also important to point out that all these substances are present in the ambient environment in
many locations.  The average crustal value of beryllium concentration in the earth’s surface has
been reported to be 2.8 µg/g [26], and typical concentrations in surface water are 0.01 to
1.0 ng/g.[27]
3.1.1  Beryllium
For beryllium, the primary target organ is the lung, with concerns for both acute and chronic
exposures.  Acute exposure by inhaling beryllium fluoride produces an inflammatory reaction of
the entire respiratory tract; in the most severe cases it produces acute fulminating pneumonitis.
Though not universally agreed to, the severity appears to be related to dosage, and exposed
individuals can recover after weeks or months.[28,29]  It is highly selective among individuals,
3Table 1.  Threshold limit values for unirradiated Flibe constituents and impurities.
a
8-hour TLV IDLH concentration
Element or compound     (mg/m3)                   (mg/m3)           
Beryllium
NIOSH 0.0005 4, carcinogen
ACGIH 0.002, STEL is 0.01
OSHA 0.002, C is 0.005,
OSHA STEL is 0.025
see note b
Beryllium compounds
NIOSH 0.025
ACGIH 0.002, STEL is 0.01
OSHA same as for Be metal
Carbon (as graphite)
NIOSH 2.5 1250
ACGIH 2
OSHA 5 (respirable dust, synthetic)
OSHA 15 (total dust, synthetic)
Cobalt
c
NIOSH 0.1 20
ACGIH 0.02
OSHA 0.1
Fluorine
NIOSH 0.2 39
ACGIH 1.6, STEL is 3.1
OSHA 0.2
Iron oxide
c
NIOSH 10 2500
ACGIH 5
OSHA 10
Lithium no TLV for LiF was listed
d
Manganese compounds
c
NIOSH 5 as Ceiling 500
ACGIH 0.2
OSHA 5 as Ceiling
4Table 1.  Continued.
                 ____
8-hour TLV IDLH concentration
Element or compound     (mg/m3)                   (mg/m3)           
Scandium no TLV for Sc was listed
Zinc oxide
c
NIOSH 5 (respirable dust)
NIOSH 15 (total dust) 500
ACGIH not listed
OSHA 5 (respirable dust)
OSHA 15 (total dust)
Particulates not
otherwise regulated
OSHA 5 (respirable dust)
OSHA 15 (total dust)
Note a:  Values are from NIOSH [25], ACGIH [30], and OSHA [31].  IDLH stands for
Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health; workers must exit the area immediately to reduce
exposure to the airborne chemical.
Note b:  Beryllium has a proposed DOE rule to reduce the eight hour average worker exposure to
an action limit of 0.5 µg/m3 of air, see the “Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program,”
Federal Register, Volume 63, No. 232, December 3, 1998, pages 66940-66975.
Note c:  It is assumed that some amount of oxide formation will occur when these impurities at
elevated temperature are exposed to air.  While masses of impurities should be small, the
chemistry of these impurities must be investigated to determine the severity of the safety
concern.
Note d:  Lithium hydride is the only lithium compound for which an airborne exposure standard
has been established.  The TLV is 0.025 mg/m
3
.[25,30,31]  LiF is a soluble lithium compound
that would be readily absorbed by ingestion and slowly absorbed through the skin as an ionized
salt; lithium distribution in the body appears to be rapid and uniform (it does not appear to seek
organs).  Lithium salts are diuretic.[32]  This can pose a health threat if a person receives a large
acute dose.  Fluorine at elevated temperature can react with moisture in air to form hydrofluoric
acid mist.
                 ______
5and its incidence appears correlated with levels of beryllium in air at low concentrations but not
at high concentrations.[33]  Berylliosis or chronic beryllium disease may be localized to the
lungs, or systemic involvement may also occur.  As beryllium or beryllium compound particles
accumulate in the lungs over time, small interstitial granulomas form in the alveoli.  In later
stages of the disease, the granulomas cause the alveoli to lose functionality, leading to respiratory
dysfunction.[28,29]  These symptoms may not appear until years after the exposure, and the
symptoms can grow worse over time even after cessation of exposure.
Contact dermatitis is another common beryllium toxic effect for occupationally exposed
individuals, but there are insufficient data to determine whether it occurs in the general
population.[28,23]
BeCl2, being highly soluble in water, poses a greater systemic threat than does free elemental
beryllium because of its mobility in the body.  Metallic beryllium found in the workplace
invariably will be coated with an insoluble oxide film, unless the particle has been freshly cut or
abraded.  Beryllium fluoride contact may result in lesions on the skin of sensitive individuals as
an allergic reaction.  If beryllium compounds contact cuts or abrasions in the skin, necrotizing or
ulcerative lesions may form, and these may heal very slowly or not heal at all.  Surgical excision
may be required to heal the wound.[29, 34 ]
Dealing with exposure issues for beryllium and its compounds has been a matter of increasing
concern in the U.S.  Under the assumption that the number and severity of cases of chronic
beryllium disease is related to the level of exposure, the U.S. Department of Energy has recently
instituted stricter control measures for monitoring airborne and surface concentrations of
beryllium and beryllium compounds in the workplace.[35]  A draft Rule[36] has been proposed
and is in review for adoption that would severely reduce acceptable levels of airborne beryllium
(0.5 µg/m3 as compared with the present OSHA exposure limit of 2 µg/m3) and require more
extensive personnel and workplace monitoring.
3.1.2  Fluorine
Another component of Flibe is fluorine.  Fluorine exposure leads to pulmonary edema and skin
burns. Inhalation of fluorine gas can cause nose and throat irritation, respiratory tract and lung
injury, unconsciousness, and even death.  If fluorine makes contact with the skin or eyes, burns
may result.  These burns are caused by heat produced when fluorine or hydrogen fluoride (the
result of fluorine reacting with moisture in the air) reacts with the moisture on the skin.
Moreover, fluoride ions can penetrate deeply to the bone, replacing the hydroxide ions in the
bone to produce injury.[37]
The IDLH value for fluorine gas is only 39 mg/m
3
, which could occur at the source of the
release.  Even assuming that hot fluorine gas quickly forms compounds, such as hydrogen
fluoride [by taking hydrogen from humidity in air], there are still risks to workers.  HF has a
TLV of 2.5 mg/m
3
 and an IDLH of 24.6 mg/m
3
.[25]
A significant concern relative to fluorine and the use of Flibe in fusion systems is the potential
for the formation and release of HF.  When the lithium is fissioned by neutron impact, not only is
6tritium, the radioactive isotope of hydrogen formed, but the loss of the lithium atom leaves a free
fluorine atom to combine with available hydrogen.  The HF poses a significant corrosion threat,
and it has its own set of health risks.  One method proposed for control of Flibe pH is the
presence of excess sacrificial beryllium, for example as free flowing pebbles or as fingers or fins
over which the flowing Flibe will pass, allowing the HF or free fluoride ions to react back to
BeF2.
3.1.3  Lithium
Lithium, which in the elemental form is highly pyrophoric, is not of particular concern with
Flibe.  None of the expected transformations or chemical reactions in the Flibe is expected to
produce free lithium.
3.2  Activation Concerns
One of the inducements for Flibe in fusion reactors is its inherent ability to produce the fusion
fuel tritium from the reaction of fusion neutrons with the lithium in the Flibe.  Beryllium will
also generate tritium by neutron transmutations.
The HYLIFE-II inertial fusion design concept using Flibe was investigated for activation; the
radioisotopes created from neutron activation of pure Flibe are 
10
Be, 
14
C (assumed released as
CO2 gas), and 
18
F (assumed released as F2 gas) [38].  The dominant activation product was 
18
F
[38,39]. Figures 1 and 2 show activation and decay schemes for the main constituents of Flibe.
18
F decays by positron emission and has a 1.8 hour half-life.  Other impurity products can also
pose activation concerns.  There will be some tritium bred in the lithium if 
6
Li is used to enhance
tritium fuel production in the coolant.  During a spill, gaseous tritium, in the form of TF or HT,
would be released from the Flibe.
Some Flibe impurities are elemental impurities that remain during Flibe mixing, some are
intentionally added to the coolant, other impurities intrude into the coolant.  Beryllium may
contribute oxygen as an impurity.  Designers may add an anticorrosive, MoF6 (perhaps at 10
ppm by weight).  Secondary coolant (NaBF4 was the secondary in the HYLIFE-II design)
leakage through the heat exchangers might intrude into the Flibe.  Either of these additions mean
that there will be impurities that can be activated.  Also, Flibe can attack Mn in stainless steel, so
erosion products from wall materials are possible, depending on the designer’s choice of
material.  Tobin [38] listed the radioisotopes generated from impure Flibe that initially contained
10 ppm by weight of oxygen and some other impurities:
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Sc
54
Mn
56
Mn
59
Fe
57
Co
58
Co
60
Co
65
Zn
710Be
9Be
8Be
10B
9Li
8Li
7Li
6Li6He
4He
3He3H
2α
6 x 10-17 s
(n,2n)
(n,2n)
(n,γ=)
(n,γ=)
(n,γ=)
(n,p)
(n,p)
(n,α)
(n,d)
(n,α)
(n,nd)
0.81 s
0.84 s
0.18 s
1.6 x 106 a
(n,t)
(n,nα)
(n,d)
Figure 1.  Activation and decay paths for lithium and beryllium in Flibe.[40]
820F
19F
18F
20Ne
19O
18O
17O
16O16N
15N
(n,2n)
(n,γ=)
(n,p)
(n,α)
(n,nt)
7.13 s
1.83 h
26.9 s
11 s
(n,t)
(n,nα)
(n,d)(n,np)
Figure 2.  Activation and decay processes for fluorine in Flibe and oxygen impurity.[40]
Considering that stainless steel 316 with a Mn component (rather than nickel) might be present,
erodants could be generated and activated [38], giving the following radioisotopes:
54
Mn
56
Mn
55
Fe
59
Fe
58
Co
60
Co
Some of these radioisotopes may oxidize in air, but concentrations should be low since the
impurity concentrations were in the ppm range.  The actual curie inventory of these radioisotopes
depends on fluence and the level of impurity or erosion.  For HYLIFE-II, Tobin [38] showed site
boundary doses between 1 and 26 rem for each of the impurity and erodant radioisotopes listed
above.  The 
18
F from pure Flibe gave a site boundary dose of 340 rem for HYLIFE-II.
Considering that workers would be closer to the more concentrated source of these radioisotopes,
their doses would be higher than the values stated for the site boundary unless appropriate
mitigative actions are taken.  Specific calculations need to be performed for the magnetic fusion
designs under consideration to determine the worker and the site boundary doses.  While these
calculations are important, it is also noted that the MSRE operated successfully from 1965 to
1969 without any extreme personnel safety events (i.e., no radiation exposure over 15 rem, and
9no fatalities or life-threatening injuries).[16,41]  A review of experience by MSRE maintenance
personnel indicated that handling the molten salt was not difficult [42] and that the maximum
exposure any maintenance personnel received was < 0.5 rem per year.[43]  Most of that exposure
came from dealing with systems containing fission fuel salt and fission products rather than
coolant salt.
One of the important concerns regarding tritium produced in Flibe is its propagation to other
parts of a fusion system.  Solubility of hydrogen isotopes in Flibe is very low.  That means that
even a small concentration of tritium produced in the Flibe by neutron transmutations will have a
very high chemical potential and will readily exit the Flibe by whatever means are available.  A
particular concern in this regard is its ability to pass through the walls of heat exchanger tubes or
other structures and enter the atmosphere or a secondary coolant stream.  Transport of tritium in
Flibe flowing in heat transfer systems is largely by convection.  Therefore, the same design
configurations that will be used to maximize heat transfer from the Flibe will also maximize the
transport of tritium.[44]
In a related matter, a number of experiments are being considered for exploring tritium safety
issues in Flibe.  Many of these are concerned with the mobilization of tritium from Flibe.[45,46]
It is not clear whether there are reasonable means for getting tritium into Flibe for such
experiments other than actual neutron irradiation.  This is because of the complex chemistry of
the various reactions involving the fluorine, beryllium, lithium, and the tritium produced.  One
priority in the forthcoming research should be to develop a successful tritiating procedure for
Flibe.
3.3  Operational Concerns
Whether using Flibe in a laboratory situation to conduct experiments, or in an operating fusion
facility, there are concerns for health and safety of workers, the public, and the environment that
arise from working with the material.  In this section we address some of these issues and make
recommendations for dealing with them.
Workers at fusion experiments are to be protected from routine hazards to a level commensurate
with that of typical industrial environments.[47]  Therefore, because molten salts are an exotic
coolant, Flibe must be assessed for personnel safety issues.  Appendix A shows an initial
framework for listing personnel exposure to hazardous agents in the workplace.[48]  Assessing
Flibe with this framework shows several hazardous agent categories where Flibe may be more
hazardous than a typical industrial environment using hot water and steam, which is the typical
coolant at a steam electric power plant and at many fusion experiments.  These hazardous agent
categories from Appendix A are thermal energy, radiation energy, and chemical energy.
The inherent chemical and activation issues with Flibe and its components were discussed above.
There are two chemical exposure scenarios with Flibe.  These are maintenance contact and
operational exposure from spills during plant operation.  Maintenance-related accidents can be
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on the order of 30 to 38% of worker accidents in a chemical facility.[49]  While nuclear facilities
could have lower percentages of worker accidents during maintenance due to rigorous work
planning, detailed procedures and compliance with regulations, worker exposure to solidified
Flibe during cooling system maintenance remains a possibility.  Tasks such as pump and valve
seal maintenance or replacement, yearly instrument recalibration, etc., could lead to skin contact
with the salt.  Fortunately, maintenance exposure should be infrequent and deal with small
masses of Flibe.
With respect to thermal energy, the Flibe is used at temperatures higher than typical steam
temperatures of 260 to 315°C, although high temperature, high pressure steam can fatally scald a
worker.  Operating near or above 540°C means that workers would be exposed to a high heat
stress environment near the cooling system equipment (piping, heat exchangers, pumps, etc.).
The environment would be more severe than for a steam plant, where working fluid temperatures
are about half as high.  Engineering controls to reduce the hazard that this high temperature
environment imposes might be piping insulation or double walled piping, high air flow general
ventilation, and physical separation, such as the use of pipe corridor exclusion areas.
Administrative controls might include exclusion areas to preclude admission near the cooling
system, limiting stay times for workers in the coolant system areas while the system is hot (the
Flibe does not melt until over 455°C, so even with solid Flibe there can be a considerable heat
load), and using a heat-alert program [34] to protect workers.  Personal protective equipment in
the form of water-cooled garments, similar to the protective clothing worn for furnace
maintenance work, could be considered if personnel are required to stay in the area.
Excluding workers from locations near the coolant piping would be a prudent precaution if there
is any concern about a Flibe leak or spill.  Modest protective clothing will not protect workers
from a hot Flibe spill, only robust, specially designed thermal suits will offer protection.  Second
degree burns can occur when the skin is elevated to 71°C for only 60 seconds.  Higher
temperatures reduce the time to damage, such as 100°C for 15 seconds results in second degree
burns.  A tolerance limit for skin exposure to heat is suggested to be 0.25 Watt/cm
2
.[50]  The
recommended approach to protect the workers from a hot Flibe spill is separation through
exclusion areas.
Maintenance should only be conducted on the cooling system when the Flibe has cooled enough
to make physical contact without concern for burns.  Maintenance guidance [51] suggests that
maintenance be carried out in temperature ranges less than 54°C for relative humidity over 20%.
If that guidance is unacceptable, then remote maintenance must be considered in the system
design.
An important issue to note is that a spill of hot molten salt in a room with air could lead to a fire
of substances that contact, or remain in proximity to, the salt.  While Flibe itself is not flammable
in air [15], the non-stoichiometric mixture produced during neutron irradiation may be reactive
wityh air, moist aire, or steam.  No experimental data exist on the mobilization of tritium and
other activated materials from neutron-irradiated Flibe under air or steam exposure.  Given the
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radiological hazard of tritium, 
18
F, and other activation products and the chemical toxicity of
beryllium, experiments are needed to better define the radiological safety hazard under accident
conditions.  Furthermore, the high temperature conduction or radiation heating from the 455°C
temperature range could ignite some grease or oil lubricants (ignition typically in the 260 to
370°C range), many types of paint (ignition typically in the 245 to 455°C range), some types of
electrical wiring insulation (typically, 425 to 590°C surface temperature range) [52], and other
combustible materials.  The Flibe temperature could also decompose concrete, so providing an
insulation barrier, such as metal liners, in the design should be examined.  Fire poses a worker
safety concern by inhalation of hot combustion products, exposure to carbon monoxide, carbon
dioxide and other toxic gases, and exposure to heat.
Fortunately, maintenance exposure should be infrequent.  Engineering controls to preclude skin
contact with Flibe would be to select or design instruments that can be calibrated without
opening to the process fluid, choose long life seals, and design for maintainability.
Administrative controls might be to limit maintenance activity by using reliability centered
maintenance approaches rather than periodic preventive maintenance, and to use mockups of
equipment to be maintained or practice on the facility before it becomes activated—these efforts
would support maintenance planning and allow workers to have practice sessions.  Personal
protective equipment might include gloves and protective clothing to serve as a barrier to the
Flibe.  Such equipment would also be required to serve as contamination control protective
clothing.  It should be noted that beryllium in solid and powder form is safely handled at
manufacturing companies such as Brush-Wellman in Ohio.
A Flibe spill during facility operation could result in tritium, beryllium compound, and activated
corrosion product release.  This scenario is likely to be more hazardous than maintenance due to
the possibility for large mass releases that could reach Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health
(IDLH) concentrations.  An assumption made in the radiological calculations discussed above
was that the fluorine was released as F2 gas.  As stated earlier, the actual release form must be
determined.  However, fluorine has been reasonably safely handled at uranium gaseous diffusion
plants for many years.
Calculations by Dolan and Longhurst [39] showed that if one kilogram of Flibe was assumed to
be released as aerosol during a large spill event, then 660 grams of LiF and 340 grams of BeF2
would be released.  Using standard dispersion assumptions, the Be compound concentration in
the building would be high enough to require worker protection.  The LiF compound may also
pose debilitating health effects [32], but currently only lithium hydride has been studied for its
health concerns from workplace exposures.  Worker protection could be in the form of timely
evacuation or use of supplied air protective suits to prevent radiological contamination,
inhalation of beryllium compound and other particles, and fluorine gas from contacting the skin.
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4.  CONCLUSIONS
This preliminary investigation of the personnel safety aspects of Flibe molten salt identified three
hazard areas where the salt could present safety challenges beyond the typical industrial
environment.  These three areas are thermal energy in the coolant (high temperature but low
pressure), radioactivity of the coolant and its impurities, and chemical toxicity of the coolant and
its impurities.  In each case, several initial suggestions to enhance personnel safety through
design, operational approach, and use of protective equipment were presented.  Qualitatively, the
molten salt hazards appear to be manageable, since similar hazards have been, or are currently
being, managed in other industries.  Harvesting the good practices formed from operating
experience at such facilities would support personnel safety enhancement through design rather
than relying on administrative procedures or personal protective equipment.
Based on this assessment, the following areas require further research:
1. Mobilization of radiologically hazardous (e.g., T, 
18
F) and chemically toxic materials (e.g.,
beryllium) from neutron-irradiated Flibe, including impurities, during air or steam interaction
2. Characterization of the physical (e.g., aerosol, vapor), chemical, and radiological form of the
mobilized materials.
3. Tritium mobilization and transfer to structures surrounding a Flibe system to evaluate the
extent to which such tritium may be a hazard
4. Health effects of LiF
5. The need for additional design provisions (e.g., double containment) or protective measures
(e.g., special clothing) in light of the stricter limits on occupational exposure to beryllium.
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